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Abstract
In a recent article Davidson, Lawrence and Wilson propose a model showing that, in the
presence of distortionary taxation and goods of different quality, tax evasion can be an
optimal device. Here, we show that this result, although quite interesting, cannot be
generalised to a framework where Government activity consists of supplying merit goods and
levying taxes to finance their provision.
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In a recent article Davidson, Martin and Wilson (2005), hereafter DMW, present
a model showing that, in the presence of distortionary taxation, tax evasion can
be an optimal strategy which, in some special cases, allows replication of a
￿rst best tax system. The model stands on four basic assumptions: a) there
are two types of goods in the economy: a numeraire and another good that is
produced in several qualities; b) goods are produced using Leontief technologies;
c) consumers￿utilities are additive, and they di⁄er in their evaluation of quality
(the marginal utility of quality is however decreasing); d) Central Government
levies taxes on the good with several varieties to ￿nance the production of a
preset level of public goods.
Although utility is linear, the assumption of decreasing marginal utility,
combined with a non-linear aggregation of linear preferences, allows the authors
to show that uniform tax is distortionary and that in some cases evasion can
improve welfare. Given a probability of being caught, Central Government
will then set a ￿ne to a level that allows an optimal tax evasion; in this way
the tax rate and the ￿ne levied are not uniform and the authors show that
welfare improves.1 In this note we use the framework proposed by DMW to
study the scope for tax evasion in an environment where the taxed good is a
merit good. We assume that the Government produces the low quality good
and subsidizes its consumption whereas the private sector produces the high
quality good (which is not subsidized). We believe that this environment is
quite suitable to represent Government activity which is more oriented towards
the production of merit rather than public goods.2
2 Merit goods, public provision and optimal tax
As in DMW, we assume a simple economy where two classes of goods are pro-
duced: a quality homogenous numeraire, and a private good whose quality can
be either low (￿L) or high (￿H > ￿L). Each agent is endowed with a given
amount of the numeraire and he decides whether to buy a single unit of the
other good and of which quality. Departing from DMW, we assume that the
two-quality product is a merit good3. Accordingly, the Government produces
and promotes the consumption of the merit good by subsidizing the low quality
variety (￿L) at rate (1 ￿ ￿) so that the price paid by the ￿nal user is a fraction
￿ of the low quality good price PL. Only the low quality is subsidized in order
1In DMW￿ s framework in fact tax evasion when possible is complete and the Government
revenue is given by the ￿nes on tax evasion.
2In OECD countries about one fourth of public expenditure is represented by public goods
and their share is decreasing through time.
3A merit good is a commodity which is judged that an individual or society should have
on the basis of a norm other than respecting consumer preferences. One rationale for this is
paternalism, that the government or other donor provides such a good on the basis of "merit,"
because it can better provide for individual welfare than allowing consumer sovereignty (Mus-
grave, 1987). Alternatively, there may be more acceptance for income redistribution in the
form of goods, rather than, say, purchasing power (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1973, p. 81).
1to reduce as far as possible the burden of Government activity. We believe that
health care and education could be two relevant examples. In fact, they are
produced both in the public and the private sector, but with di⁄erent standards
as regards quality4 and prices. The utility function of agent i who buys the
good whose quality is j 2 fL;Hg can be written as
Ui = Ei ￿ ￿jPj (￿j) + ￿iv (￿j);
where v is an increasing and concave function of the quality (￿j) and is the
same for any agent, Ei is the numeraire endowment of agent i (which can be
transformed into either labour or capital), Pj (￿j) is the price of the good j as
a strictly increasing function of the quality ￿j, and ￿i 2 [0;1] is a preference,
agent-speci￿c parameter that is distributed according to the continuous density
function h(￿) and the cumulate distribution H(￿): Although the distribution
h(￿) is obseved by the Government, each single value of ￿ is private information
to the consumer. This is the reason why subsidies and taxation can be applied
to goods, but they cannot depend on personal characteristics of the consumers.
This means that, as in DWM, an optimal tax system cannot be de￿ned. The
subsidy ￿j is either zero for the high quality good or constant for the low quality
good (i.e. ￿L = ￿ and ￿H = 1). The reason for subsidizing only the low quality
good is twofold: (i) since the public expenditure is always distortionary, it should
be kept to the minimum, and (ii) if the low quality merit good satis￿es consumer
needs, there is no reason to subsidize another good that only di⁄ers in its quality
content. Given the absence of depreciation and assuming zero interest rate, zero
pro￿ts and a Leontief production function, both inputs are paid the same cost
W and in equilibrium prices for the goods must satisfy:
Pj = Wj (1 + tj);
where tj is the tax on good j.5 Any agent i may behave in three di⁄erent ways
as regards the choice of the merit good:
1. he does not buy it; this happens if and only if he has a preference ￿i such
that




4The di⁄erence in quality levels might be related: (i) to the number of hotel services
provided in private hospitals as regards health care, and (ii) to the average number of pupils
in each classroom as regards education.
5DMW choose to model the tax rate in a slightly di⁄erent way. Let us call ￿j their tax
rate, then in their model the link between price Pj and cost Wj is given by Pj =
Wj
1￿￿j . We
made our choice in order to simplify the ongoing computations and, nevertheless, our result
can be traced back to that of DMW through the following equalities:
￿j
1 ￿ ￿j




22. he buys the high quality product; this happens if and only if he has a
preference ￿i such that
Ei ￿ PH (￿H) + ￿iv (￿H) > Ei ￿ ￿PL (￿L) + ￿iv (￿L)
, ￿i >
PH (￿H) ￿ ￿PL (￿L)
v (￿H) ￿ v (￿L)
￿ ￿H;
3. he buys a low quality product, this happens if and only if he has a prefer-
ence ￿i such that ￿L < ￿i < ￿H.
Other things being equal, the level of ￿ discriminates between the market
for the subsidized and the other variety since it lowers ￿L and increases ￿H.
However, in the context of a full general equilibrium, this conclusion might be
too simplistic since the e⁄ect of the tax system should also be studied. To
do so, let￿ s start by studying a framework without tax evasion and where the
two goods can be taxed at di⁄erent rates. In particular, given the Central
Government subsidizes the low quality good, the latter is not taxed, i.e. tH = 0:
This assumption can be justi￿ed on several grounds: the tax on good L would
simply be a clearing entry since Central Government has to subsidize the price
gross of the indirect tax6. The merit good nature of the commodity considered is
modelled through $(￿): This is a distibution of weight that Central Goverment
attaches to the utility derived from the consumption of the merit good. We
assume that
@!(￿)
@￿ < 0 i.e. more weight is attached to the utility of those
at the low end of the distribution of ￿; which also represent the individuals
that are more likely not to buy such commodity when there is no subsidy.
We also assume that the distribution of ! (￿) satis￿es the following condition R 1
0 $(￿)h(￿)d￿ =
R 1
0 g (￿)d￿ = 1





(￿vL ￿ ￿PL)! (￿)h(￿)d￿ +
Z 1
￿H
(￿vH ￿ PH)! (￿)h(￿)d￿ (1)








and the following condition:
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
The solution is presented in appendix 1 and can be written as:
6In any case for a given subsidy ￿￿, it is always possible to ￿nd a combination (￿￿￿;t￿
L)
that replicates the proposed solution and respects the budget constraint.




vL (vH ￿ vL)
WL
(1 ￿ HH)
(1 ￿ HH)(GH ￿ GL) ￿ (1 ￿ GH)(HH ￿ HL)






vL (vH ￿ vL)
(1 ￿ HH)(GH ￿ GL) ￿ (1 ￿ GH)(HH ￿ HL)
hL (vH ￿ vL)(1 ￿ HH)





WH (1 ￿ HH)
!
:
The weight Central Government attaches to the consumption of the merit
good determines the solution of the problem as expected. When the distribution
of the weights is uniform, there is no scope for the subsidy as shown in appendix
one. If relative more weight is given to individuals with a low ￿; ￿ < 1 and
the exact value depends on the two distributions of individuals and weights.
Finally, for a ! su¢ ciently shewed towards the individuals at the low end of
the preference distribution, ￿ = 0; and ￿￿
L = 0 which means that the optimal
tax and subsidy are set so that everybody buys one of the goods. This result
is in line with the economic theory on the provision of merit goods; what it is
interesting to note is that in this context tax evasion in its classical meaning
is simply not possible. The burden of providing the merit good to consumers
that ask for the low quality good cannot be shifted. The only e⁄ect tax evasion
might have is to reduce the number of users of the lower quality service by
making it more convenient for the marginal consumer to shift to the higher
quality consumption. In this case, public expediture and the tax burden would
shrink and we might have an improvement to welfare through tax evasion as in
DMW. To check whether this e⁄ect exists and if it is welfare improving, let￿ s
￿rst examine the decision of the ￿rm to evade.
As in DMW, we assume that the ￿nal consumer bene￿ts from tax evasion
through a reduction in the price of the good he buys. Tax evasion is possible,
but there is a probability ￿ of being caught. In this case, the ￿rm should pay
a ￿ne f proportional to the cost of production. Firms are assumed to be risk
neutral; this means that they evade if
￿fWH < tHWH;





Accordingly, in order to avoid tax evasion, Central Government should set f
such that f = tH
￿ . In DMW the implicit assumption is that Central Government
chooses to set f to a level that allows tax evasion. In this way the e⁄ective
tax rate paid in the two sectors is di⁄erent and welfare improves. Does this
result hold in the presence of a merit good? Our answer is no. To show this,
let￿ s assume, as in DMW, that Central Government foresees that the ￿rms in
the private sector may evade if the ￿ne and the probability of being caught
are suitably chosen. If such an instrument were welfare improving, we should
expect the Government to allow tax evasion. We introduce this assumption in
4our model and determine Central Government optimal policy. When evasion is
taken into account, the price of the high quality good could be either WH when
the ￿rm evades, or WH(1+f) when the ￿rm evades and is caught. Accordingly,
the expected price for good with quality ￿H will be
PH = (1 ￿ ￿)WH + ￿fWH = WH(1 + ￿f);

















The new problem and constraint have the same structure as Problem (3)




vL (vH ￿ vL)
WL
(1 ￿ HH)
(1 ￿ HH)(1 ￿ GL) ￿ (1 ￿ GH)(1 ￿ HL)








Thus, Central Government sets the ￿ne at the lowest level not allowing tax
evasion. This means that in the presence of a merit good it is not optimal to
arti￿cially decrease the price of the good produced in the private sector through
tax evasion. In this system tax evasion might of course still exist if, as it is
plausible to assume, Central Goverment is not able to observe the technology of
production and the exact cost of production.8 If this is the case, there will be tax
evasion in equilibrium, but at the cost of decreasing total welfare. This means
that even in this very simple model where the costs of tax evasion in terms of
controls and marginal cost of public funds (Levaggi, 2007) are not considered,
tax evasion is not welfare improving. Thus, tax evasion is not always an optimal
tax device, something that has been pointed out also by Davidson, Martin and
Wilson (2006) themselves. We belive that the article proposed by the authors
is a good starting point for studying the problem from a di⁄erent perspective,
in ways that the literature has not explored so far, but the models should also
take account of the nature of some of the goods that form public expenditure
and for whose provision taxation is widely used.
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6Appendix: Demonstration of Proposition 1
Given Problem (1) and the constraint (2), we can write the Lagrangean using




(￿vL ￿ ￿PL)! (￿)h(￿)d￿ +
Z 1
￿H












0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
where: ￿ is the Lagrangean multiplier. The system of the ￿rst derivatives of








vH￿vL ￿ ((1 ￿ GH) + ￿(1 ￿ HH))WH
@L
@￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)WLHH ￿ HL ￿ tHWH (1 ￿ HH)
where HH ￿ H (￿H), HL ￿ H (￿L), hH ￿ h(￿H), hL ￿ h(￿L);GH ￿
H (￿H)￿(￿H), GL ￿ H (￿L)￿(￿L), gH ￿ h(￿H)! (￿H), and gL ￿ h(￿L)! (￿L)
The second and the third derivatives can be equalised to zero since the
budget is binding; the ￿rst one has to be solved using Khun Tucker Conditions.
If 0 < ￿ < 1; the three equations can be solved as equalities and the solution
can be written as:
￿￿ = 1 ￿
vL(vH￿vL)









The distribution !(￿) determines whether the Khun Tucker conditions are
binding.Let us consider two extreme cases. If Central Government is not inter-
ested in redistribution !(￿) = 1; i.e. weights are uniform. In this case Gi = Hi
and ￿￿ = 1 as expected. The other extreme is to assign all the weight to the
individual with the lowest preference for the merit good (￿ = 0) using Dirac￿ s
￿ distribution to represent the weights9. In this case the optimal unconstrained
￿ would be equal to -1: The Khun Tucker condition is binding and ￿ = 0:In
general, the value of ￿ depends on the combined e⁄ect of the distribution of the
population and the function representing the weighs. To give a ￿ avour of the
result, we present a numerical example based on the following assumptions: a







2￿; vL = 4; vH = 5; WL = :7; WH = 1
The relative weights given to individual with low income is determined by
b. For b = 0, all the individuals are given the same weights, b = 2represents the
maximum redistributive power of this function as shown in ￿gure1
9See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirac_delta_function for a de￿nition of the function.
7The optimal ￿ for such example is presented in ￿gure 2 ￿ decreases the
steeper the distribution of weights as expected.
Figure 1: Value of weights $(￿) with b=0(dashed line); b=1(dotted line); b=2
(solid line)
Figure 2: Value of ￿ according to di⁄erent values of b
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